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J. GARRY CLIFFORD· 
BLOWING ON THE WIND: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DEBATE. By 
ROBERT A. DIVINE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 393 pp. 
THE LION'S LAST ROAR: SUEZ, 1956. By CHESTER L. COOPER. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1978,310 pp. 
FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL 
INSTRUMENT. By BARRY M. BLECHMAN AND STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, WITH 
DAVID K. HALL, WILLIAM B. QUANDT, JEROME N. SLATER, ROBERT M. 
SLUSSER AND PHILLIP WINDSOR. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978, 
584 pp. 
Nostalgia for the 1950s seems to be a growing phenomenon. Amid our cur-
rent frustration it is easy to remember the 'simpler times' that preceeded Viet-
nam and Watergate. In the face of disaster in Iran, near catastrophe at Three 
Mile Island, Soviet troops in Cuba ·and Cuban troops in Africa, students of 
American politics can recall when the United States was indisputably the 
supreme power and 'Ike' and 'Foster' spoke confidently for the entire Free 
World. 
But nostalgia is not always an accurate guide to the past. The three books 
under review deal primarily with the politics and dimplomacy of the 1950s and 
early 1960s, and each does so without sentimentality. The Test Ban Debate, 
the Suez fiasco, and the political use of American armed forces short of war 
are all subjects of current importance as Washington grapples with S.A.L. T., 
the Middle East, and an appropriate military strategy after Vietnam. 
However, the issues are not new. 
* • * * • 
Robert A. Divine's Blowing on the WimP is a professional historian's attempt 
to analyze the most important foreign policy debate of the Eisenhower years 
- the controversy over nuclear testing and its relationship to the Soviet-
American arms race. Divine, a prolific scholar from the University of Texas, 
pulled together all the memoirs, government hearings, magazine articles 
(scientific and popular), and newspaper accounts on this grim subject. He ex-
amined manuscripts at the Eisenhower Library, most notably the rich Ann 
Whitman Diary series, and the SANE papers at Swarthmore College. He also 
OJ. Garry Clifford is Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut and is 
author of THE CITIZENS SOLDIERS: THE PLATfSBURG TRAINING CAMP MOVEMENT, 1913-1920 
(1972) and co-author of AMERICAN FORIEGN POLICY: A HISTORY (1977). 
1. R. DIVINE, BLOWING ON THE WIND: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DEBATE. (1978). 
[hereinafter cited as DIVINE). 
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utilized unclassified materials of the Atomic Energy Commission, even 
though security regulations rendered this source less helpful than it might have 
been. Although the book was in press before the Three Mile Island incident 
and the recent government hearings concerning excessive cancer rates in areas 
close to the Nevada testing grounds, Blowing on the Wind will not go unnoticed 
in the continuing debate on nuclear energy. 
Beginning with the BRAVO hydrogen bomb test at Bikini atoll in March 
1954, which led to the fall-out contamination of the Japanese fishing vessel 
Lucky Dragon, and concluding with the Test Ban Treaty of 1963,2 Divine cap-
tures both the controversy and its protagonists. His work is "without heroes or 
villians," and yet certain individuals are more heroic and some more 
villainous than others. For example, Admiral Lewis Strauss, head of the AEC, 
was convinced that continued testing posted only negligible health risks and 
that American nuclear superiority was all that prevented the Soviets from 
launching World War III and killing millions. Strauss thought the Lucky 
Dragon was a "red spy outfit" spying on the American tests.3 Scientists Linus 
Pauling and Edward Teller stood at opposite ends of the scientific debate over 
fall-out, each was certain on the basis of inadequate evidence that testing was 
either harmless (Teller) or a deadly menace (Pauling). Hubert Humphrey and 
Harold Stassen emerged as champions of test ban negotiations; Humphrey as 
the key Democratic critic in Congress, and Stassen, until his resignation early 
in 1958, as chief disarmament adviser in the Eisenhower administration. The 
Soviets were hardly cooperative. Whether offering to ban nuclear weapons en-
tirely (but refusing to link nuclear weapons with other disarmament measures) 
or loudly promoting a test ban without inspection Oust after a series of Soviet 
tests), and Kremlin generally treated disarmament negotiations as a propa-
ganda exercise. As with the Americans, the dictates of national security meant 
that the Soviets would J!latch test for test, weapon for weapon. 
According to Divine, Eisenhower was caught in the middle. Initially skep-
tical due to national security concerns, the President began to consider test 
ban proposals in 1956. However, he backed off angrily when Adlai Stevenson 
challenged him on the subject during the presidential campaign. Thereafter he 
waivered with uncertainty while his diplomatic and scientific advisors debated 
with the AEC and Pentagon. John Foster Dulles' advocacy of a test ban in 
early 1958 seemed to tip the scales, and an unsupervised moratorium on 
testing was established for the remainder of Eisenhower's term. However, 
negotiations for a comprehensive treaty bogged down, largely over the issue of 
inspection. Serious talks ended after the U-2 Affair in May 1960. The Rus-
sians resumed testing in the summer of 1961 (including the awesome 58 
2. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5; 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 [hereinafter cited as Test Ban Treaty). 
3. DMNE supra note 1, at ix. 
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megaton blast) and the Kennedy administration repeated the deadly cycle. 
Only after the Cuban Missile Crisis did negotiations begin anew. These 
negotiations culminated in a treaty banning atmospheric tests in June 1963.4 
Since 1963, more nuclear tests have been conducted than in the period from 
1945 to 1963, but nearly all have been underground and without fall-out. 
A theme certral to Divine's analysis is that the policy debate of the 1950s 
centered on nuclear testing because the real issue was too devastating, com-
template. He comments that "instead of coping with the danger of all-out 
nuclear war in which the blast and heat and fall-out might destroy most of the 
American population, they focused on the less drastic but still insidious threat 
of poisoned milk and contaminated air." 5 The test ban became a kind of 
, 'magic talisman" to ward off the evil nightmare of atomic war. According to 
Divine, "not until the strident warnings of Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear 
War, the fallout shelter scare, and the Cuban missile crisis ... did the 
American people finally comprehend the reality of nuclear catastrophe."6 In 
view ofthe strident arguments today in opposition to the S.A.L.T. II Treaty, 
and nuclear energy after Three Mile. Island, one wonders if the American peo-
ple are still seeking a "magic talisman" and refusing to contemplate the most 
serious issues of co-existence in the nuclear age. 
• • • • • 
Chester Cooper's The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 195fi1 is a less scholarly but more 
readable book than Divine's. Cooper, who was a young CIA officer stationed 
in London during the Suez affair, is one of' a handful of former American 
policy-makers who have written memoirs that constitute significant contribu-
tions to history. His book Lost Crusade,8 based on his experience as a State 
Department and NSC official under Kennedy and Johnson, ranks with the 
best memoir accounts of the Vietnam war. The Suez volume is part autobiog-
raphy, but it is also thoroughly grounded in the published literature and sup-
plemented by interviews with such key participants as Lord Avon. In fact, 
Cooper's deft juxtaposition of his own activities on the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee in London with the larger dramas elsewhere is the literary highlight of 
his book. 
It is a critical study. Unlike recent scholars who have praised Eisenhower 
and Dulles for not falling over the brink, Cooper castigates American strategy 
and tactics throughout the Suez affair. Nor does he spare the British. "Dour 
Dulles," as Cooper calls the Secretary of State, was perhaps the chief 
4. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 2. 
5. DIVINE. supra note 1, at 11. 
6. /d. at 323. 
7. C. COOPER, THE LION'S LAST ROAR: SUEZ, 1956 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cooper). 
8. C. COOPER, THE LAST CRUSADE (1969). 
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blunderer. Obsessed with his anti-communist crusade, Dulles initially was 
overly optimistic about keeping Nasser's Egypt within the Western orbit, and 
then overly petulent and insensitive in withdrawing the Aswan Dam offer in 
the summer of 1956.9 Cooper is particularly sarcastic about Dulles' plan for a 
Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) to operate the waterway, especially 
since Nasser and his "Gyppos" proved incompetent without foreign pilots. 10 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden, although portrayed more sympathetically, 
receives low marks for his diplomatic deceit and incompetent handling of the 
Suez military operation. However, the British chiefs of staff must share the 
blame with Eden. They remembered all too well the failure of the paratroop 
assault on Arnhem in 1944 and therefore insisted on a full air-sea-ground at-
tack that took too long to implement." 
As for Eisenhower, Cooper portrays the President in a limited role prior to 
the hospitalization of Dulles for cancer midway through the crisis. There is no 
doubt that Ike was thoroughly angry at the British-French-Israeli invasion. In 
one transatlantic telephone call he mistakenly gave a Prime Minister's aide 
"unshirted hell," believing the aide to be Eden himself. 12 Eisenhower insisted 
on a cease-fire and withdrawal of the UN. The President was largely respon-
sible for the downfall of Eden's government and was soon promising 
American intervention in the Middle East to maintain stability. Harold Mac-
Millan wryly observed that "the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 would have 
saved us all in 1956. "13 
Although The Lion's Last Roar is primarily an historical work, Cooper has 
also considered contemporary issues. In describing the once proud British 
Empire in decline after World War II, i.e., slow to adjust to new international 
realities and mistaking revolutionary nationalism for something worse, 
Cooper has posed an obvious parallel for post-Vietnam America. He also 
writes about the "what if?" factor. 14 Because the State Department and White 
House were convinced in 1956 that England and France would not act without 
their knowledge, there was virtually no planning for other contingencies. 
Leaders in London and Paris, equally certain that the United States would 
support them in a pinch, had not bothered to plan any graceful exits. Finally 
Cooper notes that Washington is a "one-crisis-at-a-time community." While 
he does not provide a detailed analysis of the contemporaneous Soviet inva-
sion of Hungary, the implication is that Eisenhower and Dulles mishandled 
that affair as well. 15 
• • • • • 
9. COOPER, supra note 7, at 5. 
10. [d. at 131. 
11. /d. at 206-207. 
12. [d. at 167. 
13. /d. at 247. 
14. /d. at 219. 
15. /d. at 151. 
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Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan's Force Without War l6 will not attract 
the popular readership of the other two volumes. Bearing the imprimatur of 
the Brookings Institution with sections written in the heavy jargon of Defense 
Department analysis, the book will no doubt be required reading among 
political science graduate students and members of the National Security 
Council. This important study has two broad objectives. It seeks first to ex-
amine the espisodes in which the United States has used armed force for 
political goals since World War II. In this setting it tries to identify trends in 
such uses of force "in terms of the context in which the military units were 
employed, and variations in the size, type, and activities of the military units 
themselves." 17 It also attempts to evaluate the long and short term effec-
tiveness of the armed forces as a political instrument by analyzing the conse-
quences of such factors as: 
the size, type, and acitivity of military units involved in the inci-
dent; the nature of the situation at which they were directed; the 
character of U.S. objectives; the international and domestic con-
text in which the incident occurred; and the extent and type of 
diplomatic activity that accompanied the use of the armed forces. 18 
Some thirty-three postwar incidents are subjected to rigorous comparative 
scrutiny in one section of aggregate analysis. In a second section case studies 
by five independent scholars of ten postwar episodes are recounted and 
analyzed in detail. The purpose here is to test generalizations resulting from 
the aggregate analysis. While not surprising to most students of recent 
American foreign policy, the book's findings are notable if only for the 
systematic manner in which they were obtained. 
This reviewer preferred the historical case studies. David K. Hall has com-
pared American military moves during the Laotian War of 1962 and the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1971. Hall is less critical of Kennedy than Nixon. However, 
he argues that both military efforts were counterproductive and that "the im-
pact of military signaling on the successful resolution of international conflict 
is typically less decisive than the impact of undramatic political and economic 
forces. "19 William B. Quandt's analysis of Lebanon (1958) and Jordan (1971) 
suggests that each American intervention, while successful in its short term 
goals, was not only based on shaky premises and misread local political condi-
tions, but risked an expansion of commitments that would be counterproduc-
tive to U.S. interests. In the case of Jordan, the Nixon Administration's 
perception of the crisis of a test of will between the Super Powers precluded the 
16. B. BLECHMAN & S. KAPLAN. FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES As A 
POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1978). 
17. /d. at 3. 
18. ld. at 4. 
19. /d. at 221. 
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adoption of policies that might have avoided the Yom Kippur War of 1973. 
Similarly, Jerome Slater's careful study of military moves toward the 
Dominican Republic from 1961 to 1966 suggests that "in a constructive and 
longer term sense these interventions had little effect; as a society and as a poli-
ty, the Dominican Republic has followed its own rather than any 
U.S.-directed cQurse."20 Phillip Windsor's comparison of Yugoslavia (1951) 
and Czechoslovia (1968) and Robert Slusser's study of the two Berlin crises 
(1958-59 and 1961) reflect more favorably on the judicious political use of 
armed forces in confrontations with the Soviet Union. They also underline a 
major theme of Force Without War, i.e., that military demonstrations are more 
effective when aimed at maintaining a previous situation. Even in the case of 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Windsor argues that U.S. demonstra-
tions helped to deter further Russian encroachments on Rumania or 
Yugoslavia. 
In an excellent concluding chapter that deserves attention in Washington, 
Blechman and Kaplan summarize the results of both the aggregate analysis 
and case studies. The discrete use of political force seems to be less successful 
in modifying state behavior than in preventing action. More favorable out-
comes were also associated with attempts at affecting intranational situations 
rather than international ones. There also appears to be a direct relationship 
between the size of American forces, the firmness of the commitment, and the 
successful outcome. Nonetheless, Blechman and Kaplan are quick to observe 
that Vietnam was an exception to this rule. The authors suggest that armed 
force should not be used for the purpose of bluffing. It is axiomatic that when 
foreign decision-makers perceive that important American interests are in-
volved, the discrete use of force produces favorable outcomes. Blechman and 
Kaplan conclude with one very important caveat: "we have found that over 
the longer term such uses of the armed forces were not often associated with 
positive outcomes. Decision-makers should thus not expect them to serve as 
substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies tailored to the realities 
of politics abroad. "21 PoliticaVmilitary operations have not served well as 
remedies for difficult international problems. At best they help stabilize situa-
tions and allow time for other forms of diplomacy to achieve lasting solutions. 
It is refreshing to have such a cautiously non-interventionist message from 
scholars partially funded by the government. As Vietnam recedes from the na-
tional consciousness and as nostalgia for the good old days grows, there will be 
voices urging the greater use of military force. A defect of the Blechman and 
Kaplan study is that its analysis focuses on the international context and con-
sequences of American political and military operations. There is little con-
20. /d. at 342. 
21. /d. at 532. 
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sideration of the domestic political ramifications of American intervention. In-
tervention might be counterproductive abroad, but sometimes it may be 
politically useful at home. The Mayaguez affair is a good example. David Hall 
observes that "few political executives can be expected to have both the in-
tellectual detachment and the political courage to state publicly that the risks of 
escalation associated with U.S. military deployment were assumed necessar-
ily.' '22 Perhaps alter reading Force Without War they might at least understand 
the realities. 
22. Id. at 221. 
